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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
BUD LEACH, formerly George J. ) 
Leach, an individual, ) BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Plaintiff and Respondent ) 
) WELDEN L. DAINES 
VS. ) 
WELDEN L. DAINES; J. R. WILLYARD; ) No. 88-0421 
SHELDON PLAYER; KENNETH K. KNIGHT, ) 
individuals; and ROCK SPRINGS ) 
LTD., a Utah Limited Partnership, ) 
Defendants and Appellant. ) 
WELDEN L. DAINES, 
Cross-claim Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KENNETH K. KNIGHT, J. R. 
WILLYARD and SHELDON PLAYER, 
et. al., 
Cross-claim Defendants. 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court of the State of 
Utah is conferred pursuant to Article VIII, Section 3, of the 
Utah Constitution, Rule 3 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court, and § 78-2-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended. 
References are as follows: 
Index pp. : refers to the pages of the 
original records as paginated by the Salt 
Lake County Clerk's Office. 
Addendum, Ex. : refers to the exhibits 
attached in the Addendum of Respondent's, 
Welden L. Daines' Brief. 
Tr.: refers to the transcript of record. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN TRIAL COURT 
This is a civil action which involves an action 
upon a promissory note, commenced by Leach against Daines, 
Knight and others (case number C-86-7249). The case was 
consolidated with an action filed by Knight against Daines 
and others (case number C-87-7445). 
The factual issues presented in both cases were 
tried before a jury. 
Respondent Welden L. Daines, pursuant to Rule 
24(i), R. Utah S. Ct., adopts by reference the brief of 
respondent Bud Leach for purposes of this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
In addition to the issues presented by Leach in his 
brief, the following issues are presented for review to this 
Court, as they relate to respondent Daines. 
1. Did Knight present to the trial Court a prima 
facie case of professional negligence against Daines. 
2. Should Daines be entitled to judgment against 
Knight for the amount of the judgment which Leach obtained 
against Daines. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
DISPOSITION OF TRIAL COURT 
Leach commenced this action (C-86-7249) against 
Daines, Knight, Player and Willyard seeking to recover the 
amount due him on a promissory note executed by Daines, 
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Player and Willyard, dated June 10, 1980. Recovery was 
sought against Daines, Player and Willyard on the basis that 
they were the makers of the note; recovery was sought against 
Knight on the basis that he had expressly assumed liability 
for the payment of the note by virtue of certain agreements 
dated November 15, 1983. Daines filed a cross claim against 
Knight seeking judgment against Knight for any amount for 
which he might be liable to Leach. 
Knight filed a separate action (C-87-7445) against 
Daines, Willyard, Player and Leach, seeking rescission of the 
agreements, on the basis that Knight was defrauded by Daines 
in entering into the agreements. 
Knight's defenses to the cross-claim by Daines in 
action C-86-7249 and the basis for his claims of action C-87-
7445 were based upon the theories of a) fraud by Daines 
against Knight; and b) breach of Daines1 fiduciary duty to 
Knight because Daines was (i) Knight's partner, and (ii) 
Daines preparation of the 1983 partnership tax returns did 
not report a termination of the partnerships for purposes of 
the IRS Code. 
The two cases were consolidated and the matter was 
tried to a jury, the jury answering special interrogatories 
in which the jury determined that Daines did not defraud 
Knight in executing the agreements of November 15, 1983. 
The trial Court also entered a directed verdict 
against Knight and in favor of Daines on the issue of the 
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breach of Daines' fiduciary duty to Knight. 
Judgment was entered in favor of Leach and against 
Knight, Daines, Player and Willyard. Judgment was also 
entered in favor of Daines and against Knight in the same 
amount as the judgment of Leach against Daines; the judgment 
was entered on October 11, 1988. It is from this judgment 
that Knight appeals. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 10, 1980, Daines, Willyard and Player 
signed the Leach Note in the amount of $ 274,222.50. Leach 
had previously had discussions with Daines about becoming a 
partner with Daines, Willyard and Player in the Rock Springs 
Hilton Hotel being constructed in Rock Springs, Wyoming. 
Leach advanced money with respect to the development of the 
hotel. When he did not become a partner, his advances got 
converted to the Leach Note. (Index p. 615, Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 
31-35; 44-47). 
The Leach Note was payable in monthly payments of $ 
5,000.00. The payments were made on a timely basis for over 
three years. (Index p. 615, Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 28-29; 48). On 
November 15, 1983, Knight entered into certain agreements 
with Willyard, Player and Daines, pursuant to which Knight 
took over management of the hotel and expressly agreed to 
assume and pay the obligation owing to Leach on the Leach 
Note. (Index p. 615, Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 48-51, Addendum, Ex. 
"A"). 
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Only one $ 5,000.00 payment was made on the Leach 
Note after Knight assumed the obligation to pay it. (Index 
p. 617, Tr. Vol. 3, p. 74). Thereafter, during early and 
mid-1984, Knight informed Leach's counsel that the hotel was 
having trouble and he was unable to make the $ 5,000.00 
payments, but that he would make monthly interest only 
payments while he was trying to turn the hotel around. 
(Index p. 617, Tr. Vol. 3, p. 75). Knight did, in fact, make 
monthly interest only payments of approximately $ 1,638.00 
per month covering a period of approximately two years. 
Knight made no claim during this period of time that he had 
been defrauded or wasn't liable on the Leach Note. In fact, 
during late 1984, Knight tried to persuade Leach to take an 
interest in the hotel in lieu of the amount owing on the 
Leach Note and represented to Leach the hotel was making 
thousands of dollars each month. In fact, the hotel was not 
doing well. Knight eventually stopped making payments in 
early 1986, solely because the hotel didn't have the money, 
and this lawsuit was filed. (Index p. 617, Tr. Vol. 3, pp. 
81-83; 86-91). 
Some months after the lawsuit was filed, Knight 
contended for the first time that he was not liable to pay 
the Leach Note because he had been defrauded by Daines into 
assuming liability by misrepresentations by Daines concerning 
the financial condition of the Rock Springs Hotel. (Index p. 
617, Tr. Vol. 3, pp. 81-83). 
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Knight for the first time in his answer to cross-
claim by Daines (Index pp. 175-206) asserted that Daines 
breached his fiduciary duty to Knight. Subsequently and in 
the various amended pleadings filed by Knight in case number 
C-86-7249, and in case number C-87-7445 (Index pp. 2-28) 
Knight re-asserted his claims for Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
(Second claim, Index pp. 10-11), and Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
- Tax Liability, etc. (Index pp. 11-16, Third Claim). The 
gravamen of Knight's claim against Daines on the theory of 
breach of fiduciary duty re: termination for purposes of the 
IRS Code, is, that Daines had "... failed to properly report 
the termination of the partnerships for tax purposes ..." 
(Index p. 15 - paragraph 35) upon the partnership tax returns 
for the year 1983. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
There is no legal basis upon which this Court 
should reverse the judgment of the trial Court. 
1. The trial Court was correct in entering 
directed verdict against Knight and in favor of Daines on the 
issue of the alleged breach of fiduciary duty by Daines in 
not reporting -for tax purposes- the termination of the 
partnerships. The interpretation of § 708 of the IRS Code by 
Daines relating to the exception of the termination 
provision, was proper and in accordance with the standard of 
care used by other skilled professionals. 
2. The judgment of the trial Court in awarding a 
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contemporaneous judgment in favor of Daines and against 
Knight, in the same amount as the judgment recovered by Leach 
against Daines was proper; there is no legal basis upon 
which that portion of the Judgment of the trial Court should 
be reversed. 
3. Knight's appeal to this Court is frivolous; 
this Court should affirm the trial Court and award Daines his 
costs and attorney's fees incurred in connection with this 
appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT 
IN GRANTING DIRECTED VERDICT IN 
FAVOR OF DAINES ON THE ISSUE OF 
DAINESf MALPRACTICE SHOULD BE 
AFFIRMED. 
Knight's attack on the trial Court's order 
directing verdict in favor of Daines on the issue of the 
preparation of the partnership's tax returns is couched in 
terms of a violation of a breach of a fiduciary duty owed to 
Knight by Daines because Daines was an accountant - CPA, and 
the preparer of the partnership's tax returns for the year 
1983; and further, upon the basis that Daines had a fiduciary 
duty to Knight because they were partners. 
1. Daines did not commit 
malpractice in the preparation 
of the tax returns, and thus he 
did not breach his "fiduciary" 
duty to Knight. 
The factual elements underlying Knight's pleaded 
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theory of liability (Third Claim of Relief, Amended 
Complaint, case no. C-87-7445, Index p. 54-59) are based upon 
Knight's theory of liability in terms of professional 
malpractice. Knight is alleging that he has suffered losses 
because the partnership was not terminated in accordance with 
section 708 of the Internal Revenue Code; that Daines' 
failure to prepare the partnership tax returns showing a 
termination, was negligence. 
The law has recognized that accountants as a 
skilled professional class is subject generally to the same 
rules of liability for negligence in the practice in their 
profession as are members of other skilled professions., 
(Smith v. London Assurance Corp., 109 A. D. 882, 96 N. Y. S. 
820 (1905)). 
A well known excerpt from Cooley's Torts states: 
In all those employments where peculiar 
skill is requisite, if one offers his 
services, he is understood as holding 
himself out to the public as possessing 
the degree of skill commonly possessed by 
others in the same employment ... . But 
no man, whether skilled or unskilled, 
undertakes that the task he assumes shall 
be performed successfully, and without 
fault or error; he undertakes for good 
faith and integrity, but not for 
infallibility, and he is liable to his 
employer for negligence, bad faith, or 
dishonesty, but, not for losses 
consequent upon mere errors of judgment. 
(3 Cooley, Torts 335 (4th ed. 1932)). 
Negligence, on the part of accountants and tax 
preparers, requires the same elements as does actions for 
negligence against attorneys, doctors, architects, and 
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engineers. Before liability for negligence can be imposed, 
the elements of: (1) a duty to conform to a required 
standard of care, (2) a failure or breach of duty to conform 
to that required standard, (3) a causal connection or 
"proximate cause" between the defendant's conduct and the 
plaintiff's damage, and (4) actual loss or damage incurred by 
plaintiff, must be found. (W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law 
of Torts § 30 at 143 (4th ed. 1971)). 
For Daines not to have his motion for directed 
verdict be granted by the trial Court, Knight had to 
establish the "standard of care" applicable to Daines and 
Daines' breach of that standard. 
Because these matters are outside the knowledge and 
experience of lay persons, expert accountant's/tax preparer's 
testimony was required to establish causation, the standard 
of tax preparation for partnerships re: termination, the 
breach of the standard, and the damages as a consequence 
thereof. 
In his case in chief, Knight failed to prove that 
Daines breached his duty as an accountant for the partnership 
in not preparing the partnership tax return reporting (for 
purposes of the IRS Code) that the partnership was 
terminated; he also failed to provide evidence to the trial 
Court showing that he suffered any actual losses, damages or 
other injury from the non-termination of the partnerships. 
Assuming arguendo that Daines had a duty to Knight 
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in preparing the tax return for the Partnership as to whether 
or not to show a termination of the partnership for tax 
purposes, Dairies' duty was that of exercising the skill and 
knowledge ordinarily possessed and exercised by other 
members of the profession of tax preparers in similar 
circumstances, in preparing the tax returns for the 
partnership. It was Knight's burden of proof to make by 
preponderance of the evidence, a prima facia case, through 
expert testimony, that the above referred to duty by Daines 
was breached; furthermore, Knight had the burden of proof 
that Daines1 acts (in not reporting termination of the 
partnerships) were a proximate cause of Knight's injury, if 
any, and lastly, that Daines alleged failure to exercise the 
requisite skill caused damages to Knight. 
A. No breach of standard of care. 
Knight failed to establish a failure or a breach of 
duty to a required standard of care by Daines. The only 
evidence in the record as it relates to both issues of: a) 
the duty owed to Knight by Daines, and b) the breach of such 
duty by Daines, comes from the examination of Kevin Heyborne, 
the certified public accountant who was called by and 
testified as an expert on behalf of Knight. 
The examination of Knight's expert witness as it 
appears upon the transcript, (Index p. 616, Tr. Vol. II, p. 
68, line 16 through p. 86, line 15) clearly establishes that 
Daines did not breach the duty which he had, that is, to 
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prepare the tax returns for the partnership in any manner 
other than as prepared. 
Mr. Heyborne in testifying he said that he relied 
upon and considered as authoritative sources for purposes of 
income tax partnership taxation the following: 
a) Tax Management Portfolio, 1983 Tax Management, Inc., 
237-2d, p. 42 (Index p. 616, Tr. Volume 2, p. 71, lines 9-12, 
Addendum, Ex. "B" ). 
b) IRS Regulations § 1.708-1, Research Institute of 
America Service, Federal Tax Coordinator 2d, pp. 15,125-
15,126 (Index p. 616, Tr. Vol. 2, p. 72, lines 16-19, 
Addendum, Ex. "C"). 
c) Revenue Rulings, 75-423, I. R. B. 1975 - 40,8 (Index 
p. 616) Tr. Vol. 2, p. 71, lines 19-21, Addendum, Ex. "D"). 
d) CCH Standard Federal Tax Reports, para. 3940.01 
(Index p. 616, Tr. Vol. 2, p. 72, lines 20-22, Addendum, 
Ex. "E" ). 
All of the foregoing statutes, rules, regulations 
and treatises (Addendum, Ex. "B", "C", "D", "E",) applicable 
to the issue of termination, clearly provide for the 
exception of § 708 of the IRS Code, evidencing non-
termination of the partnerships; the evidence clearly and 
unequivocally support the interpretation by Daines of § 708 
of the IRS Code, in NOT providing for the termination of the 
partnership for tax purposes; they also clearly and 
unequivocally support the method of preparation of the 
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partnership tax returns in not terminating them. 
Mr. Heyborne fully agreed with the foregoing as it 
is shown by the record: 
Q. Now, sir, does that mean, in essence, if 
the partners, both incoming and withdrawing, 
desired not to have a termination, the way to 
structure the transaction in order to avoid 
the consequences of termination --
A. Okay. 
Q. -- would be to make it look like it was a 
contribution. Isn't that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. The o t h e r a l t e r n a t i v e would be a 
liquidation? 
A. Correct. 
Q. There is no evidence the liquidation of 
any of those partnerships took place that you 
are aware of? 
A. Not that I am aware of. 
Q. And based on the returns that you have 
filed for years subsequent to 1983, and as I 
understand you testified, in f84? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You prepared them in f84? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. And for '85? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And for f86? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How about f87? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. Four years you did not cause 
liquidation, did you? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. And you did not cause a termination? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. You did not report in the K-ls or in the 
returns a termination? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Thank you. Mr. Heyborne, let me ask you 
the following hypothetical: If the intent of 
the partners were not to terminate the 
partnership for fear of accelerating a 
mortgage indebtedness upon the partnership, do 
you have an opinion as to how this particular 
transaction should have been structured? 
A. Let me put that back to you so that I am 
sure I understand what you are saying. 
Q. Sure. 
A. In your hypothetical situation you are 
saying that you have partners that if the 
partnership is liquidated or terminated --
Q. If it's terminated. 
A. -- they will accelerate their note 
payment. They did not have the cash to make 
that note payment. Then they would not want 
to do anything which would jeopardize that 
position. 
Q. That is correct. That's what I am asking 
you. 
A. Okay. 
Q. Now then, the question i s , do you have an 
opinion as to how you should structure that 
transaction? 
A. The t r a n s a c t i o n would have t o be 
s t r u c t u r e d so as not t o t e r m i n a t e the 
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partnership. 
Q. Which is exactly the same way as is 
structured here, not terminate? 
A. If that was the agreement of all the 
partners, and if that's how the consensus of 
opinion is, yes. 
Q. But that's what you would have advised 
your client to do, wouldn't you? 
A. If that's the case, that's correct. 
Q. If your client told you, I do not want to 
terminate the mortgage with Prudential Federal 
Savings, how do I go about doing it; do I have 
a termination now or do I avoid the tax 
consequences in order to defer them? Isn't 
that what you would advise them to do? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you would have structured essentially 
the transaction to be done the same way and 
the returns not to reflect a termination. 
Isn't that what you would have done? 
A. That is correct. 
Mr. Heyborne in testifying as an expert in a rather 
complicated tax matter, stated in his testimony that in 
interpreting section 708 of the Internal Revenue Code, that 
he did not do any research although he recognized the 
importance of researching in arriving at a conclusion. The 
colloquy between Mr. Heyborne and counsel for Mr. Daines is 
rather instructive on this point; it appears as follows: 
Q. Would you agree, Mr. Heyborne, that income 
tax provisions, especially relating to 
partnerships, are rather complicated items? 
A. Extremely. 
Q. And would you also agree, sir, that it 
requires the research in connection with 
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arriving at a particular answer? 
A. Yes. 
Q. In connection with your testimony today, 
sir, how much research did you do in arriving 
at your opinions today? 
A. On this particular instance, basically 
there was no underlying research into the 
underlying facts and circumstances of the 
case. It was merely stating Section 708. 
Q. And you were asked that by Mr. Nebeker to 
do that research? 
A. No. Not to do the research. 
Q. Okay, Did you do any research in 
connection with your testimony today relating 
to your opinion as to the termination of the 
partnership under the rules under Section 708? 
A. Basically what I did was, under Rule 708 
if, in fact, there was a purchase of 
partnership interest, there would have been a 
termination of the partnership. I did not 
delve any further than that into that 
particular question. 
Q. I see. So you said -- you were told or 
you assumed, there has been a purchase of the 
partnership under Section 708, is it? 
A. That is correct. 
(Index p. 616, Tr. Vol. 2, p. 72, line 25 through p. 74, line 
5.) 
The standard of preparation of the partnership tax 
returns was set forth by Mr. Heyborne, to be exactly the same 
way Daines prepared the partnership tax returns. (Index p. 
616, Tr. Vol. 2, p. 83, line 11 through p. 84, line 8; see 
also: Index p. 616, Tr. Vol. 2, p. 86, lines 4-15). 
Interestingly enough when the same Mr. Heyborne 
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prepared the partnership returns [at the request of Mr. 
Knight] for each of the subsequent years, 1984, 1985, 1986, 
and 1987, he prepared them in such a way so as NOT to cause a 
termination of the partnership. (Index p. 616, Tr. Vol 2. p„ 
81, line 21 through p. 82 line 15). 
The fact that the partnership return was prepared 
in accordance with the interpretation of Mr. Daines of the 
provisions of section 708 of the IRS Code, including the 
applicable exception as to termination, is further buttressed 
by the contents of the transmittal letter of Mr. Daines to 
Mr. Knight in sending him the 1983 returns (Index p. 616, Tr. 
Vol. 2, page 182, line 20 through page 183 line 17, Addendum 
Ex. "F") wherein Daines specifically informed Knight that in 
the event of an audit, the IRS may take a different view of 
the return and it [IRS] may make a determination that a 
termination may have occurred. When Knight received the 
transmittal letter including the tax returns, Knight did NOT 
respond or take any action to indicate to Daines or any other 
third party, that Knight disagreed with the way the tax 
returns were prepared (Index 616, Tr. Vol. 2, p. 185, lines 
3-12). 
Knight's failure to establish a prima facie case 
for negligence was also impliedly acknowledged by Knight's 
counsel as evidenced by the following exchange: 
THE COURT [to Mr. Nebeker] : Do you 
think that is just a question of law, or 
do you think it is a question for the 
jury? 
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MR. NEBEKER: I think that I am entitled 
to cross-examine their experts as to what 
really happened here. 
Tr. Vol. 3, p. 123, line 22 through p. 124, line 2; see also: 
the exchange between the trial Court and Knight's counsel. 
(Index p. 616, Tr. Vol. 3, p. 124, lines 3-25). It is also 
worthy of note the fact that on the issues of malpractice, 
Knight's counsel did not examine, either in direct or cross 
examination, Daines ... the defendant against whom Knight was 
making the allegations of negligence. 
The reading of the Siller Brothers, Inc. vs. 
Comm'r, 89 T. C. No. 22 (1987) case, by Knight in his brief 
is not applicable to the facts of the case at bar. The Siller 
case is a "liquidation" and not a "termination" case; in that 
case the tax court decided that the partner was required to 
recapture the investment tax credit because it acquired 
partnership property in a liquidating distribution, and 
further that the acquiring partner could not continue to use 
the partnership property in the same business since no 
partnership existed. Similarly, the 1987 Revenue Rulings, 
relied upon by Knight in his brief, are not applicable to the 
facts of this case since they are dealing with a 
sale/exchange of partnership interests and not with 
contribution of capital into the partnerships. 
B) No proof of proximate cause. 
The record is devoid of any evidence and Knight in 
his brief does not point out any part of the record showing a 
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causal connection or "proximate" cause between Dairies' 
conduct in not reporting the termination of the partnership 
and Knightf s damages. 
C) No proof of damages by Knight. 
The record is devoid of any evidence and 
Appellant's brief does not point to any part of the record 
wherein it is shown that Knight suffered any actual loss or 
damage as a result of Daines' alleged "failure" to report the 
termination of the partnership. 
Dines respectfully submits that the trial Court 
should be sustained in its order granting Daines directed 
verdict on the issue of the preparation of the partnership 
tax returns for the year 1983. 
2. Daines' fiduciary 
duty to Knight as a 
partner was not 
breached. 
If Daines had any fiduciary duty to Knight as a 
partner, such duty by necessity must have arisen out of the 
partnership agreement, or the statutory obligations imposed 
by § 48-1-17, and § 48-1-88, Utah Code Annotated, (Addendum, 
Ex. "G") or by other agreement(s) of the partners, or by 
common law. 
There is no evidence upon the record that Daines 
breached any duty imposed upon Daines by the partnership 
agreement. Similarly, there is no evidence upon the record 
that Daines breached any of the statutory duties imposed upon 
Daines by virtue of any statutory provision. 
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As it relates to any other potential claimed breach 
of the fiduciary duty of Daines to Knight, as a partner 
arising out of a verbal agreement, that issue was found in 
favor of Daines by the jury, in that the jury, based upon the 
evidence presented, answered the special interrogatory as 
follows: 
#5 Did Daines orally agree to pay 
the entire $ 65,000.00 given him by 
Knight for taxes? 
ANSWER: Yes No X 
(Index p. 547). 
In view of the foregoing and the absence of any 
evidence of a breach of Daines1 duty to Knight as a partner 
this Court should uphold the ruling and order of the trial 
Court. 
POINT II 
DAINES IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT 
AGAINST KNIGHT IN THE AMOUNT 
WHICH LEACH RECOVERED AGAINST 
DAINES. 
Knight argues that "there is no authority to grant 
Daines a judgment against Knight merely because Knight agreed 
to assume the Leach obligation and hasn't yet performed" 
(Knight Brief, p. 20). Knight claims that Daines is not 
entitled to a judgment until he actually pays the Note owing 
to Leach. Common sense says this argument is frivolous. So 
do the cases. Knight agreed, unconditionally and without 
reservation, to assume and pay timely the Leach obligation 
(Addendum, Ex. "A", p. 2, para. 7). The jury has found that 
Knight breached his obligation. It would be absolutely 
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absurd to deny Daines a remedy for this breach unless and 
until Daines actually paid the Note. 
There are three kinds of indemnities. Levin v. 
Friedman, 317 A. 2d 831 (Md. 1974). The first kind, which 
Knight has reference to, is "indemnity against loss or 
damage". Under that type of indemnity, the indemnitee cannot 
recover until he has made payment or otherwise suffered an 
actual loss or damage. The second kind of indemnity is 
"indemnity against liability". Under this type of indemnity, 
the indemnitee is entitled to recover when a judgment is 
entered against him regardless of the fact that the judgment 
has not yet been paid. The third type of indemnity contract, 
which is involved in the present case, is described in Levin 
v. Friedman, supra at 831, 834-835 (Md. 1974) as follows: 
There is yet a third type of indemnity 
contract, however, one which contains a promise of 
the indemnitor to perform a certain act or to make 
specified payments for the benefit of the 
indemnitee. Under such a contract, an immediate 
right of action accrues to the indemnitee upon the 
failure of the indemnitor to perform, regardless of 
any actual damage has been sustained. [citations 
omitted] 
"[W]here the plaintiff holds not merely an 
agreement to indemnity and save harmless against 
the consequences of the default of the other, but 
an express promise to pay a debt, or to do some 
particular act, then the position of the parties 
entirely changes. The relation of principal and 
surety disappears, and it has been held that the 
failure to perform the act agreed on gives the 
plaintiff a right of action even before he has 
suffered any direct damage himself; and so it has 
also been decided as a rule of pleading." 
Accord: 41 Am Jur 2d, Indemnity, Sec. 28. 
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Knight's reliance upon Harshaw dba Harshaw Bonding 
Company v. Mustafa, 321 N. C. 288, 362 S. E. 2nd 541 (1987) 
is totally misplaced; in that case the North Carolina Supreme 
Court applying section 26-3.1(a) of the North Carolina 
Statutes, held that a surety on an appearance bond may not 
sue his principal until the surety has paid all or part of 
the bond. While the facts of that case are based upon a 
theory of surety - principal, the facts of the case at bar 
involve the theory of indemnity. Daines is entitled to 
judgment against Knight immediately because Knight breached 
his promise to pay the Leach note, and Leach recovered 
judgment against Daines. 
Knight appears to rely upon the recent case of 
Horman v. Gordon, 740 P. 2d 1346, 63 Utah Adv. Rep. 35, Ut. 
Ct. App., 1987); however, his reliance is again misplaced. 
That case dealt with issues of novation and release and not 
with indemnity; the Utah Court of Appeals reversed the trial 
on the issue of liability of the maker of the notes (Gordon) 
to Horman because the notes were assumed by Kingston and 
Kingston was discharged by Horman without an express 
reservation of rights. 
To allow Knight to prevail upon his theory of 
"indemnity against loss or damage" under the facts of this 
case, would create and necessitate the filing of multiple 
actions by Daines against Knight so that Daines can recover 
from Knight for each portion of the judgment amount which 
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Daines pays to Leach, or for such an amount as Leach may 
successfully obtain from Daines from successive multiple 
executions, garnishments, etc.. Judicial economy also 
dictates against acceptance of Knight's theory. 
Daines respectfully submits that this Court should 
affirm the judgment of the trial Court in awarding Daines 
judgment against Knight for the amount of the judgment 
recovered by Leach against Daines. 
CONCLUSION 
Daines respectfully submits that the trial Court 
was correct in granting his motion for a directed verdict; 
further, the trial Court was correct in awarding Daines 
judgment against Knight in the amount equal to the amount of 
judgment obtained by Leach against Daines. 
This Court should enter its order affirming the 
judgment of the trial Court. 
Additionally, Daines should be awarded its costs 
and attorney's fees in connection with this appeal, and for 
such other relief as this Court deems proper in the premises. 
DATED this ^ 4 day of January, 1989. 
NICK 
Attorney \£p6: Welden L. Daines 
Defendant-Respondent 
466 South 400 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3303 
Tele: (801) 521-4441 
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ADDENDUM 
E X H I B I T f A ! 
MEfDRANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 
THIS MEMORANDUM of U n d e r s t a n d i n g i s made ar d en tered i r it o 
t h i s 15th 3--> i f November, 1983 , by and between KENNET- K. KNIGHT, 
e: f. a:: t - i e 1 t • > a s KNI Gi i*I ai 4 WEI E EN L. DA her eirpft^r 
reftrrei to as DAINES in his capacity as; (a) General Partner of ; . *; 
(L, Mansgirg General Part' er of RSL; (c) President of Western Planning 
Co-pary, General Partner of 1't. George Travel Center (Landlord) ; (d) 
President of Mountain States Hospitali ty, Inc. and President of Nelson, 
Dai res & Assoc ia t e s and (e) i n d i v i d u a l l y , hereinafatei col lect ively 
r e fe r red to as DAINES and SHELDON G. PLAYER and "-. WILLYARD 
hereinafter reSerrei to as FLAYER AND WILLYARD. 
WITNESSETH: 
In consideration of the Assignment of Partnership in teres t of 
ever, date herewith the par t ies hereto agree as follows: 
1 . KNIGHT w i l l pay t o DAINES t h e sum o f THIR / THOUS^D 
:CLLAr;3 ( $ 3 0 , 0 ? 0 . 0 J ) toward t h e repayment o f l o a n s . 
2 . KNIG:!T assumes t h e p r o m i s s o r y n o t e t o G r a r a t o I m p o r t i n g 
Company and p a y s t h e sum o f TWENTY THOUSAND DOLLARS ( $ 2 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ) ard 
t h e b a l a n c e o f THIRTY THOUSAND DOLLARS ( $ 3 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ) p l u s i n t e r e s t t o be 
pa id or. or b e f o r e Mar c! i 3 1 , 1 9SM. 
3. KNIGHT assumes a l l o b l i g a t i o r s ard r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of 
RSLA including all accounts :,:-.'=•'.->, mortga.y fy ' -- '• • '• ' - ' c . 
'4, RSL A r e t a i n s a l l cash on hand =* ; <-..: account , i e . e i v a b l e . 
5 . S t . G eo r g. e Ti av e 1 Cen t e r ' : =-.: d l c^ d ^ co~;* om 1 s e s 
s e t t l e MS it ie ac ::r \ < "•:! ] ai d rer i: fay at l e b> R 3! A as of ft /% embei 1 5 , 1 9 M -
KNIGHT w i l l assume and pay t imely a l l f u t u r e l a rd rer i t s . , ) 
6. DAINES a s s i g r s and transfers to KNIGHT the ex i s t ing 
management con t rac t for t h e Rock Springs Hil ton Inn, inc lud ing a l l 
accounts receivable from RSLA. 
7. KNIGHT w i l l assume and pay timely the "Leach" obligation 
(of approximately $167,000.00) ard shall pay the o b l i g a t i o n t o .PLAYER 
AND WILLYARD (of approximately $366,000.00) in accordance with the 
provisions of the Supplemental Agreement. 
8. DAINES wil l deliver timely to KNIGHT a l l books and records 
of RSLA now in the possession of DAINES. 
9. This Memorandum of Understanding sha l l be deemed for a l l 
purposes a binding ard enforceable cor t r a c t . I t i s recognized by each 
of the p a r t i e s h e r e t o , however, t h a t a fur ther Memorandum may be 
r e q u i r e d t o more p a r t i c u l a r l y se t for th c e r t a i n a s p e c t s of t he 
agreement and to that extent each party hereto agrees t o execute such 
fue r the r documents as s h a l l be reasonably required in the opinion of 
the i r respect ive counsels. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the par t ies executed th i s agreement in the 
date f i r s t above wr i t ten . // / / / / 
KE?JI;ETH K. KNIGHT ~ T ~ 
VELDEN L. DAINES, individually and in 
his capacity as: 
Kanagirg Partner of RSL, 
General Partner of RSLA 
President of Western Planning Company, 
as General Partner of St. George Travel 
Center 
President of Mountain States Hospitality 
Inc. and 
President of Nelson, Haines 4 Associates 
J.R WILLYAflD 
General Partner 
SHELDON" G. PUYER 
a 
General Partner 
EXHIBIT ' B ' 
Sales of partnership interests to other partners in the 
e partnership can trigger a partnership termination, 
fever, the regulations statethat neither the liquidation 
T^artncrsftipi^ragtTIP^ property to 
pttrtucishlp iri "exchange for a partnership interest is a 
or exchaftgrffrTKmare of I7TO(b)(iKBJ.«' In Rey. 
, 75-42JT'^tlRr Service ruled mat a contnouhon of 
i to a partnership by new partners in exchange for more 
i 50 percent of the capital and profits interest in the 
nership does not terminate the partnership, since the 
fige in ownership is not the result of a "sale or ca-
dge." This suggests that the partners can avoid termina-
upon the admission of new partners or the withdrawal 
artners by structuring the transaction as a contributioxp—-
iquidation. However, as discussed in II C 4 above, the 
ity of the partners to avoid sale or exchange treatment 
contribution of cash to the partnership followed by a 
ribution of the cash to the withdrawing partner may be 
ted by the step-transaction doctrine.403 
Section 708(b)(1)(B) applies to all non-taxable cx-
nges of partnership interests. Thus, for example, in 
g v. Comr.,** the Tax Court held that a like-kind 
hange of two 25 percent interests terminated a partner-
). Moreover, the Service has rules that the transfer of a 
c than 50 percent partnership interest to a Wholly-
tcd corporation*01 or to another partnership*" termi-
ss the partnership under 1708(b)(1)(B).401 However, as 
:d in II, A, 2, above, the Service has rules that the 
version of a genera! partnership interest to a limited 
tnership interest in the same partnership is not a taxable 
nt and does not terminate the partnership. 
Effect of Termination of Partnership Under 
3708(b)(1)(A) 
If the partnership terminates under §708(b)(l)(A), 
ause one partner acquires the interest of all the other 
tners or the partnership ceases to carry on a business, 
ncial operation or venture, the taxable year of the 
tncrship closes with respect to all the partners.410 The 
:ct can be to "bunch" the income of some or all of the 
tners, if such partners have taxable years that vary from 
t of the partnership. 
Example: Assume that Partnership AB has a fiscal 
year ending January 31 and that its partners have a 
calendar taxable year. If AB terminates on November 
30, 1982, A and B are required to report in their 
returns for 1982 their distributable share of the part-
nership taxable income for the year ended January 31, 
1981, plus their share of the partnership income for the 
short period ended November 30, 1982. 
' Rep |i.7(*-i(b)(U). 
•1975-2 C I . 260. 
'Regs. |1.70S~l(b)(l)(u) eoouint in eipresa reference to 
731-1 (c)(3), which mentions the step transaction doctrine as a poten-
grouad for challenging a cofitributioVdistribuuon. 
•77 T.C. 1045(1981). 
" Rev. Rftl. 11-31, 1911-1 C.& 14. See Evans v. Comr. 54 T.C. 40 
70), afd. 447 F.2d 547 (7th Or. 1971) (Transfer of 50 percent 
Teat to wholly-owned corporation terminated partnership). 
»PJJL II16041 (January 21, 1911). 
* Other exchange! are considered ia IV, above. 
• |706<c)(l); Rega. |l.70S-l(b)(I)(iii). 
£ Effect of Termination Under l70i(b)(l)(B) 
1. Deemed Distribution-Recontribution 
If the partnership is terminated under |708(b)(l)(B)v 
the partnership is treated as having made a pro rata 
liquidating distribution of all its assets to the purchaser and 
remaining partners who, in turn, are treated as having 
recontributed the property to a new partnership, either for 
the continuation of the business or for its winding up and 
dissolution.4" All of the consequences of the termination 
flow from this deemed distribution-recontribution of the 
partnership assets.412 Some of the more significant conse-
quences include the following: 
2. Recognition of Gain 
Under §731(a), no gain is recognized on a distribution 
for a partnership unless the amount of cash received ex-
ceeds the adjusted basis of the partnership interest. Thus, 
when a partnership terminates under §708(b)(l)(B), a 
partner could be required to recognize gain on the deemed 
distribution of the partnership's assets, if the partner's 
share of the cash held by the partnership exceeds the 
adjusted basis of his partnership interest. A partner could 
also be required to recognize gain if the partner's assump-
tion of partnership liabilities on the deemed distribution is 
less than the partner's share of partnership liabilities under 
Regs. §1.752-1(e), and such excess is greater than the 
adjusted basis of the partner's interest. 
Under §721, no gain is recognized upon a contribution 
of property to a partnership in exchange for a partnership 
interest. Thus, the deemed recontribution of assets to the 
new partnership under §708 does not result in the recogni-
tion of gain. 
J. Effect on Basis of Partnership Assets 
The termination may have an effect on the basis of the 
assets of the new partnership, even if the partners arc not 
required to recognize gain. Each partner's basis for his 
share of the partnership properties deemed distributed to 
him upon a termination under §708(b)(l)(B) is the adjust-
ed basis of his partnership interest at the time of the 
distribution, less any money deemed distributed to the 
partner.413 Thus, if a partner is required to recognize gain 
on the deemed distribution because the amount of cash 
deemed distributed exceeds the adjusted basis of his part-
nership interest, the remaining assets deemed distributed to 
such partner will have a zero basis in his hands. On the 
other hand, if the adjusted basis of the partner's partner-
ship interest exceeds the amount of cash and the adjusted 
basis of the assets deemed distributed (because the partner 
purchased the interest for a price which exceeded his share 
of the adjusted basis of partnership assets), then the basis 
of the assets will be stepped up in the hands of the partner. 
The partner's basis in his partnership interest is allocated 
among the assets in accordance with §732(c), which pro-
vides that the basis (minus any money received) is allocated 
411
 Rega. |1.70l-l(b)(l)(iv). . 
m
 See generally. Birkeland and Postlewatte, T h e Uncertain Tax Rami-
ftcation* of a Terminating Deposition of s Partnership Interest - - T h e 
Constructive Termination of a Partnership," 30 Tax Lawyer 335 (1976). 
"» |732(b). 
-42 O 1983 Tax Management Inc., a aubekftary of The Bureau of National [ DEFENDANTS IXHIBIT .39 1 237-2nd 
EXHIBIT ' C 
\-ggL 
Partners and Partnerships Regs.|L708-l 
made to a person who is not a member of the partnership, 
and the rules of section 263 (relating to capita) expendi-
tures) must be taken into account. This rule does not affect 
the deductibility to the partnership of a payment described 
in section 73b(aX2) 10 a retiring partner or to a deceased 
partner's successor in interest Guaranteed pavments do not 
constitute an interest in partnership profits for purposes of 
sections 706(b)(3), 707(b). and 70Sfb) For the purposes of 
other provisions of the internal revenue laws, guaranteed 
payments are regarded as a partner's distributive share of 
ordinary income. Thus, a partner who receives guaranieed 
payments for a penod during which he is absent from work 
because of persona] injuries or sickness is not entitled to 
exclude such payments from his gross income under section 
105(d). Similarly, a partner who receives guaranteed pay-
ments is not regarded as an employee of the partnership for 
the purposes of withholding of tax at source, deferred 
compensation plans, etc The provisions of this paragraph 
may be illustrated by the following examples: 
ExMmpIc (}). Under the ABC partnership agreement, 
partner A is entitled to a fixed annual payment of $10,000 
for services, without regard to the income of the partner-
ship. His distributive share is 10 percent After deducting 
the guaranteed payment, the partnership has $50,000 ordi-
nary income. A must include $15,000 as ordinary income 
for his taxable year within or with which the partnership 
taxable year ends ($10,000 guaranteed payment plus $5,000 
distributive share). 
Example (2) Partner C in the CD partnership is to 
receive 30 percent of partnership income as determined 
before taking into account any guaranteed pavments, but 
not less than $10,000. The income of the partnership is 
$60,000, and C is entitled to $18,000 (30 percent of 
$60,000) as his distributive share. No part of this amount is 
a guaranteed payment. However, if the partnership had 
income of $20,000 instead of $60,000, $6,000 (30 percent of 
$20,000) would be partner C's distributive share, and the 
remaining $4,000 pavable to C would be a guaranteed 
payment 
Example (3) Partner X in the XY partnership is to 
receive a pavment of S 10.000 for services, plus 30 percent 
of the taxable income or loss of the partnership After 
deducting the payment of $10,000 to partner X. the XY 
partnership has a loss of $9,000. Of this amount, $2,700 
(30 percent of the loss) is X's distributive share of partner-
ship loss and, subject to section 704(d), is to be taken into 
account by him in his return. In addition, he must report 
as ordinary income the guaranteed payment of $10,000 
made to him by the partnership. 
Example (4). Assume the same facts as in example (3) of 
this paragraph, except that, instead of a $9,000 loss, the 
partnership has $30,000 in capital gains and no other items 
of income or deduction except the $10,000 paid X as a 
guaranteed payment. Since the items of partnership income 
or loss must be segregated under section 702(a), the part-
nership has a $10,000 ordinary loss and $30,000 in capital 
gains. X's 30 percent distributive shares of these amounts 
are $3,000 ordinary loss and $9,000 capital gain. In addi-
tion, X has received a $10,000 guaranteed payment which 
is ordinary income to him. 
T.D ai7S. S/23/34. 
VSJ. 
T.D i3«2. */»0/SI. T D 7WI. $/ 
11.70S-1 Continuation of partnership, 
(a) General rule. For purposes of subchapter K, chapter 
1 of the Code, an existing partnership shall be considered 
as continuing if it is not terminated. 
(b) Termination—(J) General rule, (i) A partnership 
shall terminate when the operations of the partnership arc 
discontinued and no part of an> business, financial opera-
tion, or venture of the partnership continues to be carried 
on by 3n> of its partners in a partnership For example, on 
November 20, 1956, A and B, each of whom is a 20-
percent partner in partnership ABC, sell their interests to 
C, who is a 60-percent partner Since the business is no 
longer carried on by any of its partners in a partnership, 
the ABC partnership is terminated as of November 20, 
1956. However, where partners DEF agree on Apnl 30, 
1957, to dissolve their partnership, but carry on the busi-
ness through a winding up penod ending September 30, 
1957, when all remaining assets, consisting only of cash, 
are distributed to the partners, the partnership does not 
terminate because of cessation of business until September 
30, 1957. 
(a) Upon the death of one partner in a 2-member 
partnership, the partnership shall not be considered as 
terminated if the estate or other successor in interest of the 
deceased partner continues to share in the profits or losses 
of the partnership business. 
(b) For the continuation of a partnership where pay-
ments are being made under section 736 (relating to pay-
ments to a retiring partner or a deceased partner's succes-
sor in interest, see paragraph (a)(6) of § 1.736-1. 
(ii) A partnership shall terminate when 50 percent or 
more of the total interest in partnership capital and profits 
is sold or exchanged within a penod of 12 consecutive 
months. Such sale or exchange includes a sale or exchange 
to another member of the partnership. However, a disposi-
tion of a partnership interest by gift (including assignment 
to a successor in interest), bequest, or inheritance, or the 
liquidation of a partnership interest, is not a sale or 
exchange for purposes of this subparagraph. Furthermore, 
the contribution of property to a partnership does not 
constitute such a sale or exchange See, however, paragraph 
(c)(3) of § 1 731-1. Fifty percent or more of the total 
interest in partnership capital and profits means 50 percent 
or more of the total interest in partnership capital plus 50 
percent or more of the total interest in partnership profits. 
Thus, the sale of a 3v'-percent interest in partnership capital 
and a 60-percent interest in partnership profits is not the 
sale or exchange of 50 percent or more of the total interest 
in partnership capital and profits. If one or more partners 
sell or exchange interests aggregating 50 percent or more of 
the total interest in partnership capita) and 50 percent or 
more of the total interest in partnership profits within a 
period of 12 consecutive months, such sale or exchange is 
considered as being within the provisions of this subpara-
graph. When interests are sold or exchanged on different 
dates, the percentages to be added are determined as of the 
date of each sale. For example, with respect to the ABC 
partnership, the sale by A on May 12, 1956, of a 30-
percent interest in capital and profits to D, and the sale by 
B on March 27, 1957, of a 30-percent interest in capital 
and profits to E, is a sale of 50-percent or more interest 
Accordingly, the partnership is terminated as of March 27, 
1957. However, if. on March 27. 1957, D instead of & sold 
his 30-percent interest in capital and profits to E, there 
would be no termination since only one 30-percent interest 
would have been sold or exchanged within a 12-month 
period. 
(iii) For purposes of subchapter H, chapter I of the 
Code, a partnership taxable year closes with respect to all 
partners on the date on which the partnership terminates. 
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Regs. § 1.708-1 Partners and Partnerships 
See section 706(cXl) and paragraph (cXI) of § 1 706-1 The 
date of termination is 
(a) For purposes of section 708(bKIMA), the date on 
which the winding up of the partnership affairs is com-
pleted. 
(b) For purposes of section 708(b)(1)(B). the date of the 
sale or exchange of a partnership interest which, of itself or 
together with sales or exchanges in the preceding 12 
months, transfers an interest of 50 percent or more in both 
partnership capital and profits. 
(iv) If a partnership is terminated by a sale or exchange 
of an interest, the following is deemed to occur: The 
partnership distributes its properties to the purchaser and 
the other remaining partners in proportion to their respec-
tive interests in the partnership properties, and, immedi-
ately thereafter, the purchaser and the other remaining 
partners contribute the properties to a new partnership, 
either for the continuation of the business or for its dissolu-
tion and winding up. In the latter case, the new partnership 
terminates in accordance with subdivision (i) of this sub-
paragraph. Set sections 731 and 732 and §§ 1.731-1 and 
1.732-1. For election of basis adjustments by the purchaser 
and other remaining partners, see sections 732(d) and 
743(b) and paragraph (d) of § 1.732-1 and paragraph (b) of 
$ 1.743-1. 
(2) Special rules—(i) Merger or consolidation. If two or 
more partnerships merge or consolidate into one partner-
ship, the resulting partnership shall be considered a contin-
uation of the merging or consolidating partnership the 
members of which own an interest of more than 50 percent 
in the capital and profits of the resulting partnership If the 
resulting partnership can. under the preceding sentence, be 
considered a continuation of more than one of the mcrger-
ing or consolidating partnerships, it shall, unless the Com-
missioner permits otherwise, be considered the continuation 
of that partnership which is credited with the contribution 
of the greatest dollar value of assets to the resulting 
partnership Any other merging or consolidating partner-
ships shall be considered as terminated If the members of 
none of the merging or consolidating partnerships have an 
interest of more than 50 percent in the capital and profits 
of the resulting partnership, all of the merged or consoli-
dated partnerships are terminated, and a new partnership 
results. The taxable years of such merging or consolidating 
partnerships which are considered terminated shall be 
closed in accordance with the provisions of section 706(c), 
and such partnerships shall file their returns for a taxable 
year ending upon the date of termination, i.e., the date of 
merger or consolidation. The resulting partnership shall file 
a return for the taxable year of the merging or consolidat-
ing partnership that is considered as continuing The return 
shall state that the resulting partnership is a continuation 
of such merging or consolidating partnership and shall 
include the names and addresses of the merged or consoli-
dated partnerships. The respective distributive shares of the 
partners for the periods prior to and subsequent to the date 
of merger or consolidation shall be shown is a part of the 
return. The provisions of this subdivision may be illustrated 
by the following example: 
Example Partnership AB, in whose capital and profits A 
and B each own a 50-percent interest, and partnership CD, 
in whose capital and profits C and D each own a 50-
percent interest, merge on September 30, 1955, and form 
partnership ABCD Partners A, B, C. and D are on a 
calendar year, partnership AB is also on a calendar year, 
and partnership CD is on a fiscal year ending June 30th. 
After the merger, the partners have capital and profits 
interests as follows: A. 30 percent; B. 30 percent; C, 20 
percent; and D, 20 percent. Since A and B together own an 
interest of more than 50 percent in the capital and profits 
of partnership ABCD, such partnership shall be considered 
a continuation of partnership AB and shall continue to file 
returns on a calendar year basis Since C and D own an 
interest of less than 50 percent in the capital and profits of 
partnership ABCD, the taxable year of partnership CD 
closes as of September 30, 1955, the date of the merger, 
and CD partnership is terminated as of that date Partner-
ship ABCD is required to file a return for the taxable year 
January 1 to December 31, 1955, indicating thereon that, 
until September 30, 1955, it was partnership AB Partner-
ship CD is required to file a return for its final taxable 
year. July 1 through September 30, 1955. 
(ti) Division of a partnership Upon the division of a 
partnership into two or more partnerships, any resulting 
partnership or partnerships shall be considered a continua-
tion of the prior partnership if its members had an interest 
of more than 50 percent in the capital and profits of the 
prior partnership. Any other resulting partnership will not 
be considered a continuation of the prior partnership but 
will be considered a new partnership. If the members of 
none of the resulting partnerships owned an interest of 
more than 50 percent in the capital and profits of the 
divided partnership, the divided partnership is terminated. 
Where members of a partnership which has been divided 
into two or more partnerships do not become members of a 
resulting partnership which is considered a continuation of 
the pnor partnership, such partner's interests shall be 
considered liquidated as of the date of the division. The 
resulting partnership that is regarded as continuing shall 
file a return for the taxable year of the partnership that has 
been divided The return shall state that the partnership is 
a continuation of the divided partnership and shall set forth 
separately the respective distributive shares of the partners 
for the periods prior to and subsequent to the date of 
division. The provisions of this subdivision may be illus-
trated by the following example. 
Example Partnership ABCD is in the real estate and 
insurance business. A owns a 40-percent interest, and B, C, 
and D each owns a 20-pcrcent interest, in the capital and 
profits of the partnership The partnership and the partners 
report their income on a calendar year They agree to 
separate the real estate and insurance business as of No-
vember 1, 1955, and to form two partnerships, partnership 
AB to take over the real estate business, and partnership 
CD to take over the insurance business Since members of 
resulting partnership AB owned more than a 50-percent 
interest in the capital and profits of partnership ABCD (A, 
40 percent, and B, 20 percent), partnership AB shall be 
considered a continuation of partnership ABCD. Partner-
ship AB is required to file a return for the taxable year 
January 1 to December 31, 1955, indicating thereon that 
until November 1, 1955, it was partnership ABCD. In 
forming partnership CD, partners C and D may contribute 
the property distributed to them in liquidation of their 
entire interests in divided partnership ABCD. Partnership 
CD will be required to file a return for the taxable year it 
adopts pursuant to section 706(b) and paragraph (b) of 
{ 1.706-1. 
T O . 4173. S/2VJA, 
{ 1.709-1 Treatment of orgaaixatioa and lysdicatk* coat*. 
(a) General rule. Except as provided in paragraph (b) of 
this section, no deduction shall be allowed under chapter 1 
15,126 s/x/u-its FEDERAL TAX COORDINATOR 2d 
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47 104-71 1975 Rulings 7 1,82 1 
1969, provided, as one of the alternative 
methods available to mutual savings banks in 
computing the reserve for bad debts on 
qualifying real property loans, a method 
designated as the "percentage of real prop-
erty loans method." Under this method the 
larger the qualifvmg real propert) loan ba^e, 
the larger the allowable addition to the 
bad debt reserve. (As amended by the 
Tax Reform Act of 1969, section 593(b)(3) 
now provides that mutual savmps banks 
may compute their reasonable addition to the 
reserve for bad debts on qualifying real 
property loans by the use of the percentage 
method authorized under section 58S(b)(2), 
reduced by the amount of the addition to 
the reserve for loans on nonqualifying loans 
under section 593(b)(1)(A).) 
Specifically, the question presented is 
whether the warehoused mortgages are in-
cludible in the taxpayer's qualifying real 
property loan base. To answer this question 
it is necessary to determine whether the 
transaction entered into between the tax-
payer and Z is in fact a sale or merely a 
loan in which the mortgages are utilized as 
security for repayment of the loan. 
~Xs stated above, the taxpa\er under its 
agreement with Z is not obligated to pur-
chase from Z any FH\ or VA mort-
gage that is in default. However, the risk 
Advice has been requested whether the 
transaction described below resulted in a 
termination of the partnership for Federal 
income tax purposes. 
An existing partnership offered interests in 
the partnership to incoming members for 
cash paymerts to the partnership that be-
came part of the capital of the partnership 
After the transactions were completed, the 
original partners, who had owned 100 per-
cent of the capital and profits interests 
in the partnership, then owned only 40 per-
cent of the capital and profits interests in the 
partnership. 
Section 708(a) of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1954 provides that for purposes 
of subchapter K (partners and partnerships) 
of the Code, an existing partnership shall 
be considered as continuing if it is not termi-
nated. 
Section 708(b)(1) of the Code provides, 
in part, that a partnership shall be con-
sidered as terminated only xf no partof any 
of loss is negligible because all mortgages 
are FHA insured or VA guaranteed. The 
real risk of loss from these insured or 
guaranteed mortgages arises upon the resale 
at pnees lower than the original purchase 
price. Since under the agreement, the tax-
payer and the other savings banks are liable 
for losses sustained by Z in selling the 
mortgages to other parties, the risk of loss 
under the facts in the case remains with 
the taxpayer and the other savings banks 
Thus Z is insulated from loss on fluctuations 
of FHA and VA mortgage values. See 
American National Bank of Austin v United 
States, [70-1 USTC f 9184] 421 F. 2d 442 (5th 
G r 1970), involving the question of whether 
a transaction was a sale and repurchase or 
a loan, where it was held that a national 
bank w^s not the owner of municipal bonds 
and thus could not treat the interest col-
lected by it as its own interest because only 
persons having the rights and incurring the 
risks of ownership may treat the interest 
as their own. 
Accordingly, since the taxpaver in sub-
stance is the owner of the "warehoused 
mortgages/* the mortgages are includible 
in the qualifying real property loan base of 
the taxpaver for the purpose of computing 
the addition to the reserve for bad debts 
under section 593(b)(3) of the Code. 
business, financial operation, or venture of 
the partnership continues to be carried on 
by any of its partners in a partnership, or, 
within a 12-month period there is a sale 
or exchange of 50 percent or more of the 
total interest in partnership capital and 
profits. 
Under section 1.708-l(b)(l)(ii) of the In-
come Tax Regulations, the contribution of 
property, including cash, to a partnership is 
not a sale or exchange that could cause 
its termination.
 t 
Accordingly, in the instant case, the pay-
ments of cash by the new partners as con-
tributions to the partnership in exchange for 
more than 50 percent of the capital and 
profits interests in the partnership did not 
result in a termination of the partnership 
under the provisions of section 708(b)(1) 
of the Code because the change in owner-
ship was not the result of a sale or ex-
change of partnership interests by or 
between members of the partnership. 
[B 6905] Rev. Rul. 75-423,1 R. B. 1975-40, 8. 
[Code Sec. 708] 
Partners and partnerships: Termination: Changes in interest.—Payments of cash by 
new partners as contributions to the partnership in exchange for more than 50 percent of the 
capital and profits interests in the partnership do not result in a termination of the partner-
ship under the provisions of section 708(b)(1) of the Code. Back reference: fi 3440.30. 
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EXHIBIT ' E ' 
CONTINUATION OF PARTNERSHIP— § 708 [% 3938] 45,213 
be required to file a return for the taxable year it adopts pursuant to section 706(b) and 
§ 1706-Kb). [Reg §1.708-1.] 
.10 Historical Comment: Proposed 8/12/55 Adopted 5/23/56 by T.D 6175. 
[H 3940] Termination of Partnership 
• • CCH Explanation 
.01 What is a termination? As a general rule, a partnership will not 
terminate after the death or retirement ui a partner or the taking m of a new 
partner. However, a partnership will terminate for federal income tax pur-
ports in the following situations il» its operation* are discontinued and no 
purl of any business, financial ojK-ration, or venture of the partnership 
continue* to be carried on by any of its partners in a partnership form (Code 
Sec. 708ib)(l)(A>. Reg. § 1.708-l*<b>< 1 HI)), or (2) there is a sale or exchange of 
50% or more in partnership capital and profits within a 12-month period 
(Code Sec. 708(b)(1)(B), Reg. § 1.708-l<b)< 1 KiiV). A disposition of a partner-
ship) interest by (a) gift (including assignment to a successor interest), (bi 
bequest or inheritance, (c> liquidation of a partnership, afnd (d) the contribu-
tion of property to a partnership are not treated as "sales or exchanges" 
under this 50%-or-more rule. Therefore, the partnership will not terminate in 
buch cases unless the partnership discontinues its operations in a partnership 
form. The above rules are amplified below. 
With one exception, a partnership does not terminate as long as any 
part of its business, financial operation, or venture is continued by any of its 
partners in a partnership. (Code Sec. 708(b).) And as long as a partner is 
receiving any payments from the partnership in liquidation,jH'j_sj£garded as 
a partner. Therefore, the retirement of one member of a three-man partner-
ship has no effect on its continuance or on the taxable year of the partnership. 
The complete retirement of one member of a two-member partnership termi-
nates the partnership when it ceases to conduct any business as a partner-
ship. The same applies where two member* of a three-member partnership 
I sell out to the third member. | 
Even if there were only two partners and one of them dies, the 
partnership is not considered as terminated if the estate or other successor in 
I interest of the deceased partner continue* to share in the profits or losses of J 
j the partnership busine<* «Reg. § 1.708-1 <b>< 1 "HiMa)'). This i* true wen while 
j thi- partnership business i* beinc liquidated, as long as the payments :u the | 
j t-taU or >u< cevsor l- interest are r«».^ HL: mad* «Rea $ 1.7.V> l<a ><6>> In sho:i. j 
a- !<•!.!! as ih(' deeia*iJ partner's »,..•«•**«,:* ,r. inttre>i (or ret;rir.J pa ' tnc - ' j 
ui't ivieivmg pavmu.ts ir«»:r. the par:n». r-h.p they an regarded a- piuiurs. j 
The exception mentioned above is where within any 12-month period | 
there is a sale or exchange of 50% or more of the total interest in partnership 
capital and profits. After buch an event, the continuing business is regarded 
j as a new partnership. 
Under the 1954 Code, therefore, neither State law nor the partnership 
agreement terminates a partnership. Only cessation of the business or a sale 
or exchange of a 507c or more interest can terminate it. 
Even though the sale of a 50% interest in the partnership is made 
to the remaining partners, the partnership is still terminated (Reg. 
§ 1 7081<b>(l >(ii>). The regulations also state that "liquidation of a partner-
ship interest" is not a sale or exchange for this purpose. However, in contrast, 
a business may cease operation as a partnership after the disposition of an 
I interest or interest by gift, as where two partners, each owning a 20% | 
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EXHIBIT ' F ' 
DAINES and ASSOCIATES CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS 
October 2, 1984 
466 50UTH 400 EAST 
SAU LAtf GTTY UlAH 6411$ 
TELEPHONE ( « 0 D 3 6 0 ^ 4 0 0 
MEMDf RS M€WCAN N5TTTUTE 
Of OAIFCD PU0UC ACCOUNTANTS 
EXPRESS MAIL 
Mr. Kenneth K. Knight 
11529 North 99th Street 
Scottsdale, Arizona 85320 
Re: Tax Returns 
Dear Ken: 
Rock Springs Limited 1065 - 1983 
Rock Springs Lodging Associates 1065 - 1983 
Enclosed are the tax returns for the above partnerships. 
I have signed as preparer. You should sign as general 
partner and mail in envelopes provided. Also, each 
return has a copy for you. In addition, your K-l's are 
enclosed. 
As I mentioned on the phone there is a chance, if they are 
audited, that the IRS may hold a termination of the 
partnership. The Rock Springs Associates return required 
no allocation since the partners remained the same, not so 
with Rock Springs Limited as you were allocated 98.611% of 
the loss for the last month and a half (12.60% of $404,001.88) 
and the same for investment interest (12.60% of $22,165.84). 
These returns must be filed by October 15, 1984. 
Very truly,yours, 
A 
lvelden L. Daines 
/-TUrf 
Enclosures 
I, DEFENDANTS I;J EXHIBIT 
EXHIBIT 'G' 
GENERAL PARTNERSHIP 48-1-18 
In absence of agreement or proof of agree-
ment to contrary, partners will divide profits 
and losses equally. Kimball v. McCornick 
(1927) 70 U 189, 259 P 313. 
Collateral References. 
Partnership £=» 70. 
68 CJS Partnership 176. 
60 AmJur 2d 35 to 42, Partnership f{106 
to 115. 
Accountability of partners for profits 
earned subsequent to death or dissolution, 80 
ALR 12, 55 ALR 2d 1391. 
Actions at law between partners and part-
nerships, 58 ALR 621,168 ALR 1088. 
Construction and application of section 18 
(f) of Uniform Partnership Act as to surviv-
ing partner's right to compensation for ser-
vices in winding up partnership, 81 ALR 2d 
445. 
Duty of former partner, acquiring property 
occupied by partnership business, to renew 
lease, 40 ALR 2d 102. 
Duty of one who joins with others as part-
ners or members of a joint adventure in the 
purchase of property from a third person to 
share with them the benefit of an existing 
option or executory contract for the property, 
152 ALR 1001. 
Liability of partner for failure to perform 
personal services, 165 ALR 981. 
Meaning and coverage of "book value" in 
partnership agreement in determining value 
of partner's interest, 47 ALR 2d 1425. 
Partner's breach of fiduciary duty to 
copartner on sale of partnership interest to 
another partner, 4 ALR 4th 1122. 
Powers, duties, and accounting responsibil-
ities of managing partner of mining partner-
ship, 24 ALR 2d 1359. 
Provision of partnership agreement giving 
one partner option to buy out the other, 160 
ALR 523. 
Relative rights of surviving partner and 
the estate of the deceased partner in pro-
ceeds of life insurance acquired pursuant to 
partnership agreement, 83 ALR 2d 1347. 
Right of partner or member of joint adven-
ture to share in misappropriated money or 
property, or secret profits for which he is 
required to account, 118 ALR 640. 
Right of partners inter se in respect of 
interest, 66 ALR 3. 
Salaries of partners, contract as to, 66 
ALR 2d 1023. 
48-1-16. Partnership books. The partnership books shall be kept, sub-
ject to any agreement between the partners, at the principal place of busi-
ness of the partnership, and every partner shall at all times have access 
to and may inspect and copy any of them. 
History. L. 1921, ch. 89, § 19; RS. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 69-1-16. 
Collateral Reference*. 
Partnership €=> 80. 
68 CJS Partnership § 91. 
60 AmJur 2d 167, Partnership ft 264. 
48-1-17. Duty of partners to render information. Partners shall 
render on demand true and full information of all things affecting the 
partnership to any partner, or the legal representatives of any deceased 
partner, or partner under legal disability. 
History. L. 1921, ch. 89, § 20; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 69-1-17. 
Collateral References. 
Partnership «=» 70. 
68 CJS Partnership J 76. 
60 AmJur 2d 85, 47, Partnership i{108, 
123. 
Partner's breach of fiduciary duty to 
copartner on sale of partnership interest to 
another partner, 4 ALR 4th 1122. 
48-1-18. Partner accountable as a fiduciary. Every partner must 
account to the partnership for any benefit, and hold as trustee for it any 
profits, derived by him without the consent of the other partners from any 
transaction connected with the formation, conduct or liquidation of the 
partnership or from any use by him of its property. 
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